The personal norm of reciprocity by Perugini, M. et al.
European Journal of Personality
Eur. J. Pers. 17: 251–283 (2003)
Published online 12 December 2002 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/per.474
The Personal Norm of Reciprocity
MARCO PERUGINI1*, MARCELLO GALLUCCI2,
FABIO PRESAGHI3 and ANNA PAOLA ERCOLANI3
1University of Essex, UK
2Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
3University of Rome, Italy
Abstract
Reciprocity is here considered as an internalized social norm, and a questionnaire to
measure individual differences in the internalized norm of reciprocity is presented. The
questionnaire, Personal Norm of Reciprocity (PNR), measures three aspects of reciprocity:
positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and beliefs in reciprocity. The PNR has been
developed and tested in two cultures, British and Italian, for a total of 951 participants. A
cross-cultural study provides evidence of good psychometric properties and general-
izability of the PNR. Data provide evidence for criterion validity and show that positive
and negative reciprocators behave in different ways as a function of the valence (positive
or negative) of the other’s past behaviour, the type of feasible reaction (reward versus
punishment), and the fairness of their reaction. Copyright# 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Rewarding those who have behaved nicely and punishing those who behaved badly is a
basic principle in most human societies: it is embedded in civil laws and is prescribed by
many religious beliefs. It is not surprising therefore that one of the least controversial
hypotheses in social science is that human beings have a general tendency to reciprocate
(Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). On closer inspection, however,
this assumption becomes more problematic. First, it is not obvious that everybody would
reciprocate in several circumstances. Are there different propensities to reciprocate in
different individuals? If so, is there any personality dimension that can explain and
consistently predict these differences? Would this personality dimension be an overall
factor or composed of different aspects?
Second, it is unclear how to precisely define reciprocity. At a general level there would
be ample consensus in stating that reciprocity is a social norm defined as a pattern of
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reciprocal behaviour, yet many questions would still be left open. Is reciprocity in one-shot
anonymous exchanges with different partners and in repeated interactions with the same
identifiable partner the same concept? Is reciprocity just a specific pattern of behaviour or
a motivation to abide by a rule? Is it more useful to consider just an overall general concept
of reciprocity or rather should we distinguish between rewarding and punishing
reciprocity?
In the present contribution we focus our attention on reciprocity as an internalized social
norm and propose a scale to measure individual differences in the propensity to follow the
internalized norm. We distinguish between beliefs and behaviours and, among the latter,
between positive and negative forms of reciprocity. Then we propose a questionnaire
specifically developed to measure this internalized propensity to reciprocate and we
present studies supporting the validity of this scale. Finally, we discuss the implications
and suggest further research.
The norm of reciprocity
Perhaps the most classical reference to the norm of reciprocity can be found in the work of
Gouldner (1960), who proposed that it is a general basic tendency that can be found in
most human societies throughout history. The norm prescribes that one should help those
who have helped him/her in the past and retaliate against those who have been detrimental
to his/her interests. Reciprocity has been used in social psychology to explain a wide range
of phenomena, such as attitude change (Cialdini, Green, & Rusch, 1992), intimacy in close
relationships (Surra & Longstreth, 1990), interpersonal perception (Kenny, Bond, Mohr, &
Horn, 1996), altruism (Krebs, 1975), aggression (Robarchek & Robarchek, 1998),
cooperation (Komorita & Parks, 1999), intergroup interactions (Goren & Bornstein, 1999),
consumer shopping (Miller & Kean, 1997), restaurant tipping (Rind & Strohmetz, 1999),
and gift giving (Cialdini, 1988).
The concept of reciprocity has also been used in several other disciplines, such as
sociology, sociobiology, economics, political science, anthropology, animal behaviour,
and evolutionary psychology (see e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989; de Waal
& Berger, 2000; Fehr, Gachter, & Kirchsteiger, 1997; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1998;
Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Trivers, 1971; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000). Reciprocity has
been also used often to explain patterns of outcomes in social dilemma situations. Axelrod
(1984; Axelrod & Dion, 1988) has shown that the tit-for-tat strategy, a reciprocity-based
strategy ideated by Anatol Rapoport, can guarantee the highest payoff in the long run given
certain features of the situations analysed. Many studies in the repeated prisoner dilemma
game (Komorita & Parks, 1999; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977) have investigated the
effectiveness of reciprocity in inducing cooperation among self-interested actors. Recent
research in experimental economics also supports the importance of reciprocity in
inducing equal share and efficient social outcomes in social dilemmas (see Hoffman et al.,
1998, for a review).
Despite the amount of work on reciprocal behaviour, less effort has been devoted to
providing a clear theoretical definition of what reciprocity is. In most of these studies
reciprocity has been defined as a strategy applicable to repeated interactions, mainly
described as repeated social dilemma (or two-person mixed motive) games. In these
games, if actors use reciprocating strategies such as tit-for-tat, cooperative outcomes
beneficial for the actors’ self-interest can be achieved in the long term (Axelrod, 1984;
Friedman, 1971; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991; Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982).
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The position taken by this line of theorizing is that reciprocity is merely a strategic
behaviour. The shortcoming of the self-interest maximization assumption is that such an
assumption is not able to account for reciprocal behaviour when some specific situational
features are not met. When a situation implies few interactions, for instance, reciprocity
does not pay off, but still people reciprocate. Furthermore, if self-interested gain
maximization is a motivation that is assumed to operate for all people, then all people
should reciprocate. Several experimental studies provide strong evidence that this is not
the case (Bolton & Zwick, 1995; Bethwaite & Tompkinson, 1996; Kelley & Stahelski,
1970; Van Lange, 1999), and clear individual differences in reciprocating behaviour can be
observed. Moreover, reciprocal behaviour can be observed even when people behave
anonymously with unknown partners, ruling out social approval as a potential alternative
explanation (Gallucci & Perugini, 2000; Goren & Bornstein, 1999; Komorita & Parks,
1999; Rind & Strohmetz, 1999).
To summarize, assumptions about reciprocity relying exclusively on some form of self-
interest fall short in explaining reciprocal behaviour that is not materially rewarding and
not leading to social approval. Anonymous exchanges and interactions among unknown
people are examples of such situations. To account for reciprocity in these situations, a
different meaning of the norm of reciprocity should be emphasized: reciprocity as an
internalized social norm.
The internalized norm of reciprocity
Authors have pointed to the concept of internalized social norms (Etzioni, 1989; Kerr,
Garst, Lewandowski, & Harris, 1997; Lindbeck, 1995; Schlenker, 1980) and personal
norms (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Schwartz, 1977). The main distinctive feature is
that an individual who holds an internalized social norm is likely to conform to the dictates
of the rule even when s/he is not observed or externally sanctioned. Schwartz (1977)
defines a personal norm as a self-based standard based on one’s internalized values, or
expectation for behaviour, which is enforced through the anticipation of self-punishments
and self-rewards. Therefore, reciprocity can also be considered as an individual tendency
to reciprocate others’ behaviour, that is, to reward others’ helping behaviour and to
retaliate against others’ hurting behaviour, which is based on the individual’s own
preference in so doing. In other words, reciprocity can also be conceptualized as a goal in
itself rather than exclusively as a means to achieve a goal (e.g. better material outcomes).
Several studies have investigated the role of reciprocity in situations of interdependence
of outcomes where no economic incentive can explain acting in a reciprocal manner. In
social dilemmas, individuals show the tendency to reciprocate both previous cooperation
(reward) and defection (punishment), even when unconditional non-cooperation would
guarantee higher outcomes (Komorita, Hilty, & Parks, 1991; Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert,
1992; Fehr & Gachter, 2000). In bargaining situations concessions are often reciprocated
(Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972; Esser & Komorita, 1975), even when the strategic
aspect of the interaction has minimal impact (e.g. no expectation of future interactions,
Berg, Dickeout, & McCabe, 1995). Moreover, reciprocation of the other’s strategy is
present when the other’s strategy is either observed or only anticipated (Liebrand, Wilke,
Vogel, & Wolters, 1986; Wilke & Braspenning, 1989), and can act as an enforcement
device for some forms of labour contract (Fehr et al., 1997). In accordance with these
results, Perugini and Gallucci (1998) have recently proposed a game-theoretic model of
reciprocity, where reciprocity is defined as an internalized social norm with different
Reciprocity 253
Copyright# 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 17: 251–283 (2003)
weights for different individuals. The model was tested in an experimental situation
specifically developed to allow for an unambiguous interpretation of the results (Gallucci
& Perugini, 2000). The situation was modelled as a game (Reciprocity Game), consisting
of a prisoner dilemma followed by a dictator game. Participants allocated money in the
dictator game as a function of the previous history of interactions in the prisoner dilemma
by rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. This occurred even though it was not in
their best monetary interest (i.e. there were no future interactions) and they did not know
nor would have the chance to know their opponent in the future. In contrast with the view
that individuals reciprocate only as a means to an end (e.g. to gain more in or build
credibility for future interactions), we provided strong evidence that individuals
reciprocate also as an end in itself (e.g. because they felt that the opponent deserved to
be punished or rewarded for his/her previous behaviour).
Individual differences in reciprocity
A closer look at several experimental results with monetary consequences shows clear
evidence of variation in the decision to reciprocate and its strength. For instance, the
results of Gallucci and Perugini (2000) are qualified by a relevant interaction effect with
individual differences, with some individuals reciprocating very stringently and some
more weakly or not at all. However, reciprocity is a peculiar personality dimension,
producing contextualized reactions to someone else’s behaviour. Thus, a reciprocal
behaviour needs specific reference to previous or expected behaviour by someone else
interacting with the individual (in order to be meaningful at all). The same individual
might be cooperative or vengeful depending on whether someone else previously
performed (or s/he is expected to perform) a helpful or harming action against that
individual. Moreover, people have both beliefs and expectations about other’s people
reciprocity and preferences for performing positive or negative reciprocity behaviours.
Given the central importance in the development of our proposed measure of reciprocity,
we shall turn our attention to these three components.
The distinction between beliefs in reciprocity, positive reciprocity,
and negative reciprocity
A first main distinction between beliefs and behaviours can be drawn. Beliefs in the
efficacy and widespread use of reciprocity-based behaviours and expectations of others’
reciprocal behaviour certainly play an important role in predicting reciprocating
behaviours (see e.g. Cotterell, Eisenberger, & Speicher, 1992). However, these beliefs
should be conceptually distinguished from the actual performance of a reciprocal
behaviour. Whereas in a broad sense it is reasonable that beliefs concerning the efficiency
of following a reciprocity rule, or that most people are likely to follow it, should be related
to actually performing a reciprocal behaviour, the two levels are different. This is
particularly true if the reciprocal behaviour is defined as deriving from an internal
motivation. In fact, as an internal motivation, reciprocity should lead to behaviour
according to the rule without necessarily being accompanied by a correspondent belief that
most people do it or that it is strategically advantageous to do so. Moreover, in general the
beliefs dimension should be a more distal determinant of actual reciprocal behaviour than
more specific behavioural dimensions and therefore it should be expected to show more
modest links with specific behavioural criteria.
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A second main distinction is within the behavioural domain, made by differentiating
between positive and negative reciprocity. This distinction involves at least three different
aspects: (i) sensitivity to positive versus negative interpersonal events, (ii) preference for
retaliatory versus cooperative behaviour (or positive versus negative sanctioning) directed
towards someone else, and (iii) conceptualization of what represents a fair behaviour.1
First, positive reciprocators are expected to be particularly prone to react to positive
interpersonal behaviours whereas negative reciprocators are expected to be particularly
reactive to negative ones. Therefore, whereas the former should be especially sensitive to
kind behaviour, the latter should be especially sensitive to unkind behaviour. In other
words, positive reciprocators are expected to be more attentive to and preferentially
willing to react to positive interpersonal behaviour, whereas negative reciprocators should
pay more attention and should react preferentially to negative interpersonal behaviour.
Second, positive reciprocators are expected to be particularly willing to perform positive
behaviours, or to deliver positive sanctions, following the other’s positive action (e.g. be kind
with someone if the other is kind to you) whereas negative reciprocators should be especially
willing to perform negative behaviours, or to negatively sanction, when receiving negative
behaviours from the other (e.g. retaliate against someone who has behaved negatively
towards you). Although the basic mechanism of reciprocity would call both for positive and
negative sanctions, it is expected that people may develop over time a preference for one of
the two. In fact, cultural differences and prevailing socialization practices are likely to shape
an individual’s internalized propensity to perform actions of such a different valence.
Indeed, within mainstream personality research it is common practice to conceptualize
positive forms of interpersonal behaviour (e.g. cooperation, altruism, kindness) as opposed
to negative forms of interpersonal behaviour (e.g. retaliation, aggression, hostility). This
perhaps is cleanly summarized in the label of the second of the Big Five, which is usually
named Agreeableness versus Hostility (De Raad, 2000; Wiggins, 1996).
The third feature has to do with how and when a behaviour is perceived to be fair. Fairness
is an elusive concept that can be achieved in different ways, for instance by splitting
endowments equally (equality), by balancing out inputs and outputs in the transaction
(equity), or by reciprocating in kind (reciprocity). The adoption of any of these rules in
principle can allow one to subjectively perceive an interpersonal transaction as fair. Indeed,
it appears that often fairness is more a justification of behaviour rather than a motive on its
own (Hertel, Aarts, & Zeelenberg, 2002; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). It is important to
distinguish between two meanings of fairness to appreciate the difference between positive
and negative reciprocators: fairness in interpersonal transactions and in outcomes.
Both positive and negative reciprocators are expected to have a preference for the
former type of fairness, that is, a preference for a behaviour that would restore the equity in
the ongoing interpersonal exchange, hence achieving fairness in terms of interpersonal
transactions. However, fairness in an interpersonal transaction might not be the same as
fairness in the outcomes. There are many situations where to be fair in interpersonal terms
(i.e. to give back what one feels the other deserves) is in conflict with being fair in terms of
outcomes (i.e. giving to the other an equal or fair share). Only positive reciprocators are
expected to be concerned also with this second meaning of fairness in the sense of equal
outcomes. Hence, they might be experiencing some kinds of moral dilemma when faced
with situations where the two aspects of fairness call for opposite actions.
1Although reported here all together for the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the third feature has been
identified reflecting on the outcomes of the first study, whereas the first two features were hypothesized
beforehand and guided the design of both studies.
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To summarize, we argue that different features of a specific interpersonal event (valence
of other’s behaviour) can create a frame triggering a specific aspect of individual
differences in reciprocity (positive versus negative) that in turn leads to a behaviour whose
sanctioning meaning (reward versus punishment) is congruent with the specific reciprocity
dimension, and which is perceived to be fair by both positive and negative reciprocators,
although the former are also concerned about the achievement of equal outcomes. This
means that positive reciprocators are sensitive to positive interpersonal behaviour (e.g.
when someone has been kind with them), they prefer to use positive sanctions (e.g. to
reward somebody), and they are sensitive also to fairness meant as achieving equal
outcomes (e.g. they would also like to be fair in terms of outcomes), whereas negative
reciprocators are sensitive to negative interpersonal behaviour (e.g. when someone has
behaved negatively towards them), they prefer to use negative sanctions (e.g. to punish
somebody), and they are primarily sensitive to fairness in terms of interpersonal
transactions rather than in terms of equal outcomes (e.g. they are concerned about ‘getting
even’, but not so much in terms of achieving an equal split).
From a measurement perspective, we expect that individual differences in positive and
negative reciprocity should not be strongly negatively correlated, otherwise it would
become of dubious utility to consider them as two sides of the same mechanism. However,
given the strict opposite valence of positive and negative behaviours required by the norm,
it is not likely that they are positively related. Nonetheless, both sides of reciprocity should
show a positive correlation with beliefs in reciprocity.
THE PERSONAL NORM OF RECIPROCITY QUESTIONNAIRE
The previous theoretical reasoning led us to focus on the development of a new
questionnaire, called the Personal Norm of Reciprocity (PNR), aimed at measuring
individual differences in reciprocity as an internalized norm. Consistent with the
theoretical frame, we assumed a distinction between beliefs and positive and negative
reciprocity. In the following we briefly sketch the development of the PNR (study 1) and
present its properties as resulting from five samples in two countries (Italy and United
Kingdom) for a total of 951 respondents. We present evidence of construct validity
gathered across these samples and then focus on criterion-related validity.
Questionnaire development
In the first step we created a pool of 116 items designed to measure various aspects of the
personal norm of reciprocity. The items were primarily focused on the descriptive (i.e.
behavioural) aspects of a norm rather than on their injunctive ones2 (cf. Cialdini et al.,
1991). To reduce potential sources of confounding variance, we adopted the following
generative guidelines.
First, the main generative criterion was to write items having the logical format ‘If A
does  to me, I do  to A’, with  being of a similar valence to . This format should
therefore express conditional behaviour and should reduce confounding with general
dispositional tendencies such as altruism or hostility (cf. Perugini & Gallucci, 2001,
study 1). Second, the items emphasized the costs incurred in reciprocating, in order to
reduce confounding with reward expectancies (i.e. reciprocal behaviours were generally
2We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out to us this issue.
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framed as being costly and therefore not rewarding). Third, the behaviour should refer to
one-shot exchanges and the other (A) should not be somebody well known (e.g. friend,
partner), in order to reduce confounding due to factors such as expectation of long term
gains in reciprocating that might arise as a consequence of a strategic approach based on
an enduring relation and relationship commitment.
The items were reduced to 68 after elimination on the basis of redundancy and poor face
validity. Of the remaining items, 43 focused on positive (e.g. ‘I go out of my way to help
somebody who has been kind to me before’) or negative (e.g. ‘If someone is unfair to me, I
prefer to give him/her what s/he deserves instead of accepting his/her apologies’)
reciprocity, whereas 16 items focused on beliefs about both positive and negative forms of
reciprocity as a commonly used and widely effective norm (e.g. ‘When I pay someone
compliments, I expect that s/he in turn will reciprocate’), and nine were general and
focused on both positive and negative behaviours (e.g. ‘The way I treat others depends on
how they treat me’).
This set of 68 items represented the starting pool for the first empirical study, which was
aimed at further identifying a workable subset of items clustered in few underlying
dimensions.
Study 1: development of the Personal Norm of Reciprocity questionnaire
Method: participants and procedure
First year psychology students enrolled in a psychometric course at the University of
Rome (Italy) formed the bulk of the sample. Students were also encouraged to contact
other participants, preferably not students and more than 30 years old. Participants were
motivated to participate through a lottery. Prizes varied between s12.5 and s253 and the
likelihood of winning was about 15%. The number of participants was 200, 126 of whom
were psychology students (63%), with 131 females (65.5%) and 69 males, and an average
age of 28.5 (SD¼ 12.3). The battery was composed of different parts, most of which will
be described later, including the starting pool of 68 reciprocity items. The answer scale for
these items was a seven-step Likert type, from 1 (not true for me) to 7 (very true for me).
Results and discussion
The first set of analyses was aimed at investigating the underlying dimensionality of the
items and at identifying corresponding scales with subsets of items. The items were
divided in two sets, behavioural (52) and beliefs (16), and analysed separately through
principal component analyses. The need for separate analyses is straightforward, as the
variables conceptually belong to two domains. Thus, any relation should be reflected at the
level of the factors and not at the level of the items.
The PCA on the behavioural items showed two main factors, explaining 27.7% of the
total variance.4 After oblique rotation, the two factors were weakly correlated (r¼ 0.14).
The two factors clustered together items concerning negative forms of reciprocity (e.g. ‘If
someone is unfair to me, I prefer to give him/her what s/he deserves instead of accepting
his/her apologies’) and items referring to positive forms of reciprocity (e.g. ‘I go out of my
way to help somebody who has been kind to me before’). An iterative strategy of
elimination was then pursued. In the first round, 19 items with loadings lower than 0.30 or
with loadings on both factors were eliminated and a PCA performed again with Varimax
3The actual currency was in Italian lira. The sums reported in the text are approximated on the fixed exchange rate
of s1¼ £1936.27.
4The first eight eigenvalues were 9.3, 5.1, 2.4, 2.1, 1.9, 1.8, 1.6, and 1.5 respectively.
Reciprocity 257
Copyright# 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 17: 251–283 (2003)
rotation. Given that the aim was to identify short scales for each of two emerging factors,
several relatively good items loading on the negative reciprocity factor had to be further
discarded, as well as a few items loading on the positive reciprocity factor. A second
elimination round was therefore performed with the aim of achieving a final set of nine
items for each dimension. The PCA on the final set of 18 items showed two factors
explaining 42.3% of the total variance and clearly defined as positive and negative
reciprocity.5
The initial PCA performed on the beliefs in reciprocity items showed a main factor
explaining 22.6% of the variance,6 with only three items showing loadings lower than
0.40. The target was to select nine items, similar to the scales of positive and negative
reciprocity. Therefore, four of the 13 items were further discarded. The PCA on the final
set of nine items showed a main factor explaining 29.3% of the variance, with loadings
ranging from 0.45 to 0.62. Note that four items are focused on beliefs concerning positive
reciprocity and five concerning negative reciprocity: nonetheless, a single main factor
aggregates both types of belief.
The final outcome of this study was the development of three scales with nine items
each composing the PNR.7 The three scales were named Positive Reciprocity, Negative
Reciprocity, and Beliefs in Reciprocity. In the next section we review their psychometric
properties and overall characteristics based on five samples, two Italians and three English,
collected during the last three years.
Psychometric properties
Method: participants
The descriptive and psychometric properties are based on five samples for a total of 951
participants, 363 males and 588 females, with an average age of 22.5 (SD¼ 8.5). The first
sample (IT1) is composed of 200 participants and has already been described in study 1.
The second sample (IT2) is composed of 170 Italian students at the University of Rome,
the third sample (UK1) of 114 students at the University of Leicester, the fourth sample
(UK2) of 142 students at the University of Leeds, and the fifth sample (UK3) of 325
students at the University of Essex, all the last three in the United Kingdom. The Italian
sample was thus composed of 370 participants, 125 males and 245 females, with an
average age of 25.0 (SD¼ 10.0), whereas the British sample was composed of 581
participants, including 238 males and 343 females, with an average age of 20.9 (SD¼ 6.9).
Results and discussion
Factor structure, reliability, and generalizability. Considering first the scales of positive
and negative reciprocity, the PCA on the total sample showed two clear factors, explaining
40.8% of the total variance, with the first six eigenvalues being 4.2, 3.1, 1.3, 1.0, 0.9, and
0.9, respectively. The first factor was defined by items of negative reciprocity and
explained 23.1% of variance, whereas the factor of positive reciprocity explained 17.1% of
variance. The loadings, which are reported in Table 1(a), were reasonably good, ranging
from a low of 0.33 (pr7) to a high of 0.74 (nr4).
5More details on the factorial structures will be presented later on considering the combined samples.
6The first six eigenvalues were 3.6, 1.7, 1.5, 1.1, 1.0, and 0.9 respectively.
7See Appendix A for the full list of numbered items. Hereinafter, when referring to a specific item, we shall use pr
for positive reciprocity, nr for negative reciprocity, and br for beliefs in reciprocity, followed by the item’s
number.
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The first factor for the PCA on beliefs in reciprocity explained 27.6% of the variance
and it was clearly to be preferred over alternative solutions on the basis of the scree-test
(the first six eigenvalues were 2.5, 1.1, 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, and 0.7). Loadings were comprised
between 0.45 and 0.64 (Table 1(b)). The reliabilities, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha,
were 0.83 for negative reciprocity, 0.76 for positive reciprocity, and 0.67 for beliefs in
reciprocity. The values were substantially similar for both countries (in Italy, 0.84, 0.79,
Table 1. Principal component analyses for PNR questionnaire (N¼ 951)
(a) Positive and negative reciprocity
Loadings
Items Negative reciprocity Positive reciprocity
nr1 0.72 0.02
nr2 0.58 0.03
nr3 0.71 0.06
nr4 0.74 0.01
nr5 0.72 0.01
nr6 0.65 0.16
nr7 0.40 0.12
nr8 0.69 0.09
nr9 0.63 0.13
pr1 0.14 0.71
pr2 0.05 0.71
pr3 0.04 0.61
pr4 0.11 0.63
pr5 0.16 0.59
pr6 0.14 0.51
pr7 0.11 0.33
pr8 0.03 0.42
pr9 0.01 0.73
Eigenvalues 4.15 3.07
% variancea 23.1 17.1
(b) Beliefs in reciprocity
Loadings
Items Beliefs in reciprocity
br1 0.50
br2 0.62
br3 0.50
br4 0.45
br5 0.58
br6 0.64
br7 0.46
br8 0.50
br9 0.45
Eigenvalues 2.48
% variance 27.6
aAfter Varimax rotation.
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and 0.65, and in the UK, 0.82, 0.74, and 0.68, for negative, positive, and beliefs in
reciprocity respectively).
The issue of the generalizability of the factorial structures was investigated in different
ways. First, congruence among factorial structures between countries and gender was
calculated using Tucker’s phi after Varimax and after orthogonal Procrustes rotations
(cf. McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & Paunonen, 1996). In both cases values were
extremely high, ranging from 0.96 to 1. Second, a multi-group approach using structural
equation models (LISREL 8; Jo¨reskog & So¨rbom, 1993) was adopted. A confirmatory
approach to the issues of across-sample generalizability allows formal testing of some key
hypotheses. First, it is possible to test whether the same factor loadings across samples are
defining the same factors. Second, the equality of error variances can be tested. Given the
equality of factor loadings, error invariance implies that the measurements are equally
reliable across samples. Finally, the equality of correlations among the factors across
samples can be tested. This shows whether the constructs covary in the same way across
samples.8
Table 2 displays the findings of the models for country and gender both for positive and
negative reciprocity and for beliefs in reciprocity.
For positive and negative reciprocity, considering the country, the model with all fixed
loadings was statistically significantly different from the baseline, meaning that it cannot
be assumed that loadings are invariant in Italy and the UK. An inspection of the loadings
however led to a revised model (M1a) where the loadings for four items (nr7, nr8, pr4, pr5)
were left free across countries. The revised model was not statistically different from the
baseline, meaning that invariance of loadings was achieved for all but the previous four
items. The correlations and the errors were also different between countries. For gender,
the results show that the samples have the same loadings and the same correlations, but not
the same errors. A similar result was obtained for beliefs in reciprocity across countries:
only the errors were statistically different in the two samples. Note however that in this
case there is one factor only and therefore the second model actually tested the equivalence
of factor variances. Finally, for gender there was a marginal difference between factor
loadings, but not between factor variance and errors.
The psychometric properties of the three scales are therefore reasonably good. Three
clear factors emerge, and the scales have reasonable reliabilities, even though the beliefs in
reciprocity scale is less coherent than the other two scales. Results were also supportive of
the generalizability of the factorial structure across countries and gender. The partial
exceptions resulting from the multiple group approach should be taken in perspective. A
confirmatory approach is much more powerful and it may reject models that are
empirically replicable (McCrae et al., 1996). Moreover, it is known that the chi-square is
heavily influenced by the sample size, leading to the rejection of good models when using
large samples (Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994; Bentler, 1990). This is also the case here:
the Tuckers’ phi congruence coefficients, with or without Procrustes rotation, are so high
that by any psychometric standard the corresponding factors would be considered as
equivalent. The additional power brought by using a confirmatory approach allowed the
detection of minor discrepancies that would have gone completely unnoticed with an
exploratory technique.
8It should be stressed that to ascertain factorial invariance, factor loadings should be invariant across samples,
whereas error variances and factor variances and covariances can be considered sample specific without
questioning generalizability across samples (cf. Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993; MacCallum & Tucker, 1991).
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Descriptive statistics. The average scores in the three scales in the total sample were 3.96,
3.60, and 4.99, for beliefs in reciprocity and negative and positive reciprocity, respectively.
The associated skewness and kurtosis were very low, ranging from  0.37 to 0.25,
showing that the underlying scores were normally distributed. The scores in the scales
were further analyzed in 2 2 between ANCOVAs, with gender and country as
independent factors and age as a covariate.
Scores in beliefs in reciprocity showed a small significant main effect of gender
(F(1, 948)¼ 9.56, p¼ 0.002), meaning that males hold stronger beliefs in reciprocity than
females (4.08 versus 3.89)9 and of the covariate age (F(1, 948)¼ 4.29, p< 0.05), meaning
Table 2. Generalizability across countries and gender
(a) Positive and negative reciprocity.
(i) Across countries (Italy, N¼ 370, UK, N¼ 581)
Baseline (B) 2(268)¼ 962.69, p ﬃ 0:00, RMSEA¼ 0.059 ( p¼ 0.14), CFI¼ 0.85, NNFI¼ 0.83
Models Goodness of fit Test of hypotheses
M1: fixed loadings 2(284)¼ 1031.96, p ﬃ 0:00 M1-B: 2d(16)¼ 69.27, p< 0.001
M1a: free nr7, nr8, pr4, pr5 2(280)¼ 982.65, p ﬃ 0:00 M1a-B: 2d(12)¼ 19.96, p ﬃ 0:07
M2: M1aþ fixed corr. 2(283)¼ 994.24, p ﬃ 0:00 M2-M1a: 2d(3)¼ 11.59, p ﬃ 0:01
M3: M1aþ fixed errors 2(298)¼ 1047.15, p ﬃ 0:00 M3-M1a: 2d(18)¼ 64.5, p< 0.001
(ii) Across gender (female, N¼ 588, male, N¼ 363)
Baseline (B) 2(268)¼ 952.87, p ﬃ 0:00, RMSEA¼ 0.077 ( p¼ 0.07), CFI¼ 0.84, NNFI¼ 0.82
Models Goodness of fit Test of hypotheses
M1: fixed loadings 2(284)¼ 967.99, p ﬃ 0:00 M1-B: 2d(16)¼ 15.12, p ﬃ 0:52
M2: M1þ fixed corr. 2(287)¼ 973.54, p ﬃ 0:00 M2-M1: 2d(3)¼ 5.55, p ﬃ 0:14
M3: M1þ fixed errors 2(302)¼ 999.07, p ﬃ 0:00 M3-M1: 2d(18)¼ 31.08, p ﬃ 0:03
(b) Beliefs in reciprocity.
(i) Across countries (Italy, N¼ 370, UK, N¼ 581)
Baseline (B) 2(54)¼ 233.84, p ﬃ 0.00, RMSEA¼ 0.085 ( p¼ 0.06), CFI¼ 0.80, NNFI¼ 0.74
Models Goodness of fit Test of hypotheses
M1: fixed loadings 2(62)¼ 243.36, p ﬃ 0:00 M1-B: 2d(8)¼ 9.52, p ﬃ 0:30
M2: M1þ fixed factor var. 2(63)¼ 247.17, p ﬃ 0:00 M2-M1: 2d(1)¼ 3.81, p ﬃ 0:051
M3: M1þ fixed errors 2(71)¼ 285.99, p ﬃ 0:00 M3-M1: 2d(9)¼ 42.63, p< 0.001
(ii) Across gender (female, N¼ 588, male, N¼ 363)
Baseline (B) 2(54)¼ 207.12, p ﬃ 0:00, RMSEA¼ 0.079 ( p¼ 0.18), CFI¼ 0.83, NNFI¼ 0.77
Models Goodness of fit Test of hypotheses
M1: fixed loadings 2(62)¼ 226.43, p ﬃ 0:00 M1-B: 2d(8)¼ 19.31, p ﬃ 0:013
M2: M1þ fixed factor var. 2(63)¼ 226.51, p ﬃ 0:00 M2-M1: 2d(1)¼ 0.08, p ﬃ 0:78
M3: M1þ fixed errors 2(71)¼ 243.25, p ﬃ 0:00 M3-M1: 2d(9)¼ 16.82, p ﬃ 0:052
9All the average values presented for the ANCOVAs are adjusted means.
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that beliefs in reciprocity tend to decrease with age. Remarkably, there was no difference
between countries. For negative reciprocity there was a significant main effect of country
(F(1, 948)¼ 31.08, p< 0.001) and of gender (F(1, 948)¼ 22.56, p< 0.05). Negative
reciprocity was more present in Italy than in the United Kingdom (3.91 versus 3.48) and
more between males than females (3.87 versus 3.52). For positive reciprocity, there was a
significant main effect of country (F(1, 948)¼ 15.19, p< 0.001), and a significant
interaction with gender (F(1, 948)¼ 7.78, p< 0.01). A simple main effect analysis of the
interaction showed that the significant effect was due to females, who showed more
positive reciprocity in Italy than in England (5.21 versus 4.82), whereas males did not
differ (5.05 versus 4.99). Finally, age had a significant covariating effect (F(1, 948)¼ 9.38,
p< 0.01), meaning that scores were higher for older participants.
The most interesting finding is perhaps the dissociation across countries between the
beliefs in reciprocity and the adoption of reciprocal behaviours. It appears that both the
English and Italians are equally convinced about the effectiveness and widespread
adoption of the norm of reciprocity, but Italians are more willing to engage in both positive
and negative reciprocal behaviours than the English. It is reasonable to assume that these
differences are mainly due to the socialization process and the prevailing social norms in
the two countries. To ascertain those issues, however, a more representative sample would
be necessary.
Relations among the scales. An important test of the content validity of the three scales is
that both positive and negative reciprocity should show positive correlations with beliefs in
reciprocity and should not show negative correlations among each other. Positive
reciprocity, in fact, refers to behaviour that is related to helpfulness and kindness, although
of a conditional nature. Negative reciprocity concerns vengefulness and others’ harming
behaviour. Despite the fact that these two domains are opposite in the consequences they
produce, the scales are not negatively associated in the Italian sample (r¼  0.02, ns) and
positively associated in the English sample (r¼ 0.16, p< 0.001), suggesting that they are
not measuring general personality factors tapping an uncontextualized positive versus
negative attitude toward others, such as Agreeableness or Hostility. Both sides of
reciprocity, moreover, correlate positively with beliefs in reciprocity, ranging from 0.15 to
0.44, showing that this domain is linked to both aspects of the mechanism (see Table 3(a)).
In the Italian sample the link is higher for negative reciprocity and beliefs in reciprocity,
whereas in the English sample the links are substantially equivalent.
A feature of the PNR scales is that they do not contain reverse-keyed items. One may
argue that this may inflate the positive correlations between positive and negative reciprocity
due to acquiescent responding and perhaps mask a negative correlation. To check for this
possibility, we applied the procedure proposed by Ten Berge (1999). An acquiescence scale
was computed by considering 28 opposite pairs of FFPI items. This standardized score was
partialled out from the PNR items (for details on the procedure, see Ten Berge, 1999). The
PNR scales were then recomputed after correction for acquiescence. The correlation
between the positive reciprocity and the negative reciprocity scale was  0.01 (ns) for the
Italian sample and 0.04 (ns) for the English sample, therefore supporting once more the lack
of negative correlation between the two dimensions.
Questionnaire validation
The validity of the PNR questionnaire was investigated both considering the relations with
other personality measures (construct-related validity) and the prediction of specific
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Table 3. Intercorrelations of the PNR scales and relations with other scales in the Italian and
English samples
(a) Intercorrelations
Scale Beliefs in reciprocity Negative reciprocity Positive reciprocity
Beliefs in reciprocity 1a 0.41** 0.43**
Negative reciprocity 0.44** 1 0.16**
Positive reciprocity 0.15** 0.02 1
(b) Correlations with other scales
Scale Beliefs in Negative Positive Sample
reciprocity reciprocity reciprocity
Creditor Ideology 0.27** 0.06 0.49** IT1, UK1
Reciprocation Wariness 0.30** 0.39** 0.23** IT1, UK1
Reciprocity-norm IT1, UK1
Acceptance 0.29** 0.42** 0.02
Empathy/Attachment 0.10 0.23** 0.21** UK3a
Forgiveness/Non-Retaliation 0.10 0.64** 0.12 UK3a
Fairness/Non-Exploitation 0.01 0.43** 0.39** UK3a
FFPI—Extraversion 0.07 0.08 0.01 IT1, UK1, UK2
FFPI—Agreeableness 0.01 0.31** 0.33** IT1, UK1, UK2
FFPI—Conscientiousness 0.11* 0.14*(0.19**)b 0.01 IT1, UK1, UK2
FFPI—Emotional stability 0.18** 0.11* 0.08 IT1, UK1, UK2
FFPI—Autonomy 0.19** 0.04 0.05 IT1, UK1, UK2
Social Desirability— 0.08 0.16**(0.29**)b 0.08 IT1, IT2, UK1
Impression Management
Social Desirability— 0.01 0.04 0.09 IT1, IT2, UK1
Self-Deceptive Enhanc.
(c) Distributions for reduced Social Value Orientation types (samples IT2, UK1, UK2).
(i) Italy (N¼ 146)c
Prosocial Proself
Beliefs in reciprocity
Low 55.8%d 65.0%
High 44.2% 35.0%
r¼0.09
Negative reciprocity
Low 65.1% 58.3%
High 34.9% 41.7%
r¼ 0.07
Positive reciprocity
Low 31.4% 58.3%
High 68.6% 41.7%
r¼0.27**
Continues
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results (criterion-related validity). The first kind of validity provides also information
regarding the positioning of the personal norm of reciprocity in the personality map. The
second kind of validity shows that the questionnaire has predictive power, and also
suggests what situational characteristics interact with the individual differences in
promoting reciprocal behaviour. The five samples previously summarized provided data
related to both aspects of validity.
Construct-related validity
The PNR scales have been administered together with a variety of other measures and
scales. The full pattern of relations is reported in Table 3. As a general rule, weighted
correlations are presented whenever the same measure has been administered in two or
more samples. Equality of correlations between samples has been checked by means of
r-to-z transformations. Different values are reported if the z-difference is statistically
significant.
Reciprocation Ideology scale. Developed by Eisenberger, Cotterell, and Marvel (1987),
the questionnaire is composed of 23 items measuring three dimensions: creditor ideology
(nine items), that is, the tendency to believe in the power of the reciprocity norm, with
emphasis on the positive side (e.g. to return a favour), reciprocation wariness (ten items),
that is, the cautiousness in reciprocating help, resulting from a fear of being taken
advantage of, and reciprocity-norm acceptance (four items), that is, a person’s general
acceptance of the norm of reciprocity. Beliefs in reciprocity is correlated with all three
scales of reciprocation ideology. Negative reciprocity is related only with reciprocation
wariness (r¼ 0.39), and reciprocity-norm acceptance (r¼ 0.42), whereas positive
reciprocity is related positively with creditor ideology (r¼ 0.49) and negatively with
reciprocation wariness (r¼  0.23). The pattern of relations is therefore complex yet
Table 3. Continued
(ii) The United Kingdom (N¼ 226)c
Prosocial Proself
Beliefs in reciprocity
Low 55.3% 47.0%
High 44.7% 53.0%
r¼ 0.08
Negative reciprocity
Low 69.1% 42.4%
High 30.9% 57.6%
r¼ 0.26**
Positive reciprocity
Low 47.9% 54.5%
High 52.1% 45.5%
r¼0.07
IT1, N¼ 200; IT2, N¼ 170; UK1, N¼ 114; UK2, N¼ 142; UK3a, N¼ 230.
*p< 0.05; **p< 0.01.
aCorrelations for the Italian (lower diagonal, N¼ 370) and for the English sample (upper diagonal, N¼ 581).
bSignificant difference; value for the English sample between parentheses.
cThe number refers to classifiable participants. In Italy there were 170 potential participants, with 24 not
classifiable according to the SVO procedure. In the United Kingdom the participants were 256, with 30 not
classifiable.
dPercentages add up to 100% for SVO reduced types.
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substantially conforming to theoretical expectations. Especially interesting is that beliefs
in reciprocity correlates with all scales, as one would expect on a theoretical basis, whereas
positive and negative reciprocity have opposite relations with reciprocation wariness. In
other words, negative and positive reciprocity may represent opposite biases in favouring
the corresponding aspect of reciprocity and they appear to involve different levels of
caution in performing reciprocal behaviours.
Empathy/Attachment, Forgiveness/Non-Retaliation, and Fairness/Non-Exploitation scales.
Ashton and colleagues have recently proposed three scales as related to different aspects of
altruism (Ashton & Lee, 2001; Ashton, Paunonen, Helmes, & Jackson, 1998). The scale of
Empathy/Attachment should represent dimensions facilitating kin altruism, that is the
tendency to behave in such a way to benefit a close friend or relative (kin) even at a
personal cost. The scale of Forgiveness/Non-retaliation should mainly facilitate reciprocal
altruism and should be associated with proneness to forgive, which is one of the features
highlighted by Axelrod (1984) as important in the ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy, and predict
willingness to behave altruistically toward non-relatives. The scale of Fairness/Non-
Exploitation should represent the reluctance to exploit other people and is reminiscent of
the ‘Pavlov’ strategy (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993), based on the exploitation of people who
do not retaliate but not of those who do retaliate. Empathy was associated positively with
positive reciprocity (r¼ 0.21) and negatively with negative reciprocity (r¼  0.23),
whereas forgiveness/non-retaliation showed only a strong negative association with nega-
tive reciprocity (r¼  0.64). Fairness was positively associated with positive reciprocity
(r¼ 0.39) and negatively with negative reciprocity (r¼  0.43). However, note that this
latter correlation is much weaker when controlling for forgiveness (r¼  0.16).10 Finally,
beliefs in reciprocity are not associated with any of the altruism scales, lending further
support to the distinction between reciprocity and altruism.
The pattern of correlations suggests that all dimensions of altruism (conditional or
unconditional) are positively linked to positive reciprocity and negatively linked to
negative reciprocity, yet not overlapping. The strong negative relation of forgiveness with
the negative aspects of reciprocity is pointing out how the retaliatory element is central to
the reciprocity mechanism in its negative side. Fairness seems to emerge as another main
feature differentiating between positive and negative reciprocators: the former are very
concerned about being fair whereas the latter are not. It is likely that the negative
association between fairness and negative reciprocity is also due to the willingness to
retaliate of negative reciprocators. In fact, a retaliatory behaviour can be unfair in terms of
outcomes yet subjectively perceived as fair in interpersonal terms (e.g. to give back what
the other deserves). We shall elaborate further on the links between reciprocity and
fairness in study 2.
Social value orientation types. The concept of social value orientation reflects different
ways in which outcomes for self and others are allocated. Most research has focused on a
three-category typology, including prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations
(Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Messick & McClintock, 1968; for the definition of the
constructs, details on the measure, and scoring procedure see Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten,
& Joireman, 1997). A reduced classification is often used, based on theoretical similarities
and practical considerations: individualists and competitors are aggregated together and
referred to as proself, as opposed to prosocial (Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998). Data
10The scales of forgiveness and fairness were strongly related (0.50). No other correlation changed remarkably
when controlling for the other scales.
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concerning the SVO were available for a total of 426 participants considering both
countries (170 in Italy and 256 in the United Kingdom). Of these, 54 (12.7%) were not
classifiable. The remaining 372 respondents were classified as prosocials (47.4%),
individualists (40.4%), or competitors (12.2%). A median split within each country for
each reciprocity scale was performed and therefore the participants were classified as
either low or high for each reciprocity scale. Cross-frequency tables were then produced
separately for each country. As the frequency of competitors was low, the reduced SVO
types were considered. The resulting three 2 (reciprocity, high versus low) 2 (reduced
SVO, prosocial versus proself) cross-tables are presented in Table 3(c), reporting for
simplicity percentages by columns and the overall correlation coefficients. The association
between reduced SVO types and reciprocity types was generally low, lending further
support to the conceptual distinction between being inclined to reciprocate and being
either self-focused or preoccupied with others’ well-being. In particular, no associations
were present with beliefs in reciprocity. In Italy, there was a moderate association with
positive reciprocity, meaning that high positive reciprocators were more likely to be also
prosocials. In the United Kingdom an association was instead present with negative
reciprocity, implying that low negative reciprocators were more likely to be prosocial. In
both cases, but in different ways, to be prosocial bears some relevance to being a
reciprocator (see also Van Lange, 1999), either as being associated with a greater
inclination to positive reciprocity (Italy) or a lesser inclination to negative reciprocity
(United Kingdom).
Five Factor Personality Inventory (FFPI). The FFPI is a measure of the Big Five that has
been validated in several countries (see e.g. Hendriks, Hofstee, & De Raad, 1999; Perugini
& Ercolani, 1998). It is composed of 100 brief items with a five-point Likert-type answer
scale. Note that whereas the first four factors share the basic definitions of the Big Five
(Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability/Neuroticism), the
fifth factor is defined as Autonomy instead of Openness to Experience or Intellect, with
emphasis on the capability to take independent decisions, to maintain an independent
opinion on topics, and to not be influenced by social pressures to conform. Agreeableness
was correlated negatively with negative reciprocity (r¼  0.31) and positively with
positive reciprocity (r¼ 0.33), as expected theoretically. It is interesting to note that in
contrast beliefs in reciprocity did not correlate at all with Agreeableness. Minor negative
correlations emerged between beliefs in reciprocity and emotional stability (r¼  0.18)
and autonomy (r¼  0.19). Finally, note that conscientiousness was positively correlated
with negative reciprocity in the Italian sample (r¼ 0.14) and negatively correlated in the
English sample (r¼  0.19). It is interesting to note the almost total lack of relations
between the PNR scales and the two dimensions of extraversion and emotional stability,
which have been suggested elsewhere as defining the concept of reciprocity orientation
(Brandsta¨tter & Ko¨nigstein, 2001). It might be the case that the functional relationships
between the PNR scales and these two dimensions change depending on the level of each
dimension (i.e. each dimension functions as a moderator of the relation between the PNR
scales and the other dimension).11 To check for this possibility, we ran a moderator
analysis, by calculating the correlations between the PNR scales and each dimension (e.g.
Extraversion) at different levels of the other dimensions (e.g. Emotional Stability). The
results confirmed the existence of moderator effects for beliefs in reciprocity and positive
reciprocity, but not for negative reciprocity. In particular, beliefs in reciprocity was
11We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this insightful suggestion.
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negatively associated with Emotional Stability but only for low levels of Extraversion
(r¼  0.28, p< 0.001) and positively associated with Extraversion, but only for high
levels of Emotional Stability (r¼ 0.19, p< 0.01), whereas positive reciprocity was
negatively associated with Emotional Stability only for low levels of Extraversion
(r¼  0.23, p< 0.001) and positively associated with Extraversion for high levels of
Emotional Stability (r¼ 0.17, p< 0.01) and negatively associated for low levels of
Emotional Stability (r¼  0.19, p< 0.01). This latter result is perhaps the most intriguing.
The direction of the association between extraversion and positive reciprocity changes
depending on the level of emotional stability, which acts as a moderator. We prefer not to
speculate further at this stage and call for further research to corroborate these findings, but
this result opens up interesting possibilities in terms of exploring key mechanisms
connecting reciprocity to basic personality dimensions.
Social desirability scales. The social desirability scales are composed of ten items
measuring two facets of social desirability, impression management and self-deceptive
enhancement, using a seven-step Likert-type answer scale. The items have been selected
from the Balanced Inventory of Desirability Responding (Paulhus, 1994; Paulhus & Reid,
1991) on the basis of a previous study involving a different sample (Gallucci & Perugini,
2000).12 Impression management focuses on forms of conscious over-reporting of
performance of a variety of desirable behaviours and under-reporting of undesirable
behaviours, whereas self-deceptive enhancement focuses on forms of self-deception
functional to ego-enhancement (cognitive over-confidence). All but one of the correlations
between the reciprocity scales and the social desirability scales were not significant, the
exception being negative reciprocity and impression management. Interestingly, whereas
in the Italian sample the correlation was positive (r¼ 0.16), in the English sample it was
negative (r¼  0.29). A survey of results under no impression management demands led
Paulhus (1994, p. 23) to argue that there is a component in this scale that could be labelled
social conventionality. We suspect that this component helps in explaining the results. In
fact, one may argue that negative reciprocity in the Italian context is considered as more
legitimate than in the United Kingdom and therefore it is subject to opposite social
desirability forces in the two countries. This interpretation, although speculative, is
supported by the difference in average scores in negative reciprocity between the two
countries.13
Criterion-related validity
Two hundred Italian students (sample IT1) also provided data concerning the criterion-
related validity of the scales. After completion of a first booklet including the reciprocity
items and other questionnaires, they were given a second booklet containing five
hypothetical scenarios involving monetary outcomes. With the exception of the last, all
scenarios were constructed explicitly to allow for one-shot decisions as opposed to iterated
choices after having made available one piece of information concerning a previous
allocation choice of the opponent. The scenarios included elicitation of positive or
negative reactions that should have been predicted differentially by the positive or negative
reciprocity dimensions. That is, the criteria were chosen to capture both positive and
12In the English sample the full BIDR scale (40 items) was used. Results are the same as considering the brief
form (ten items).
13The presence of these significant correlations with impression management does not imply that the scale of
negative reciprocity has reduced predictive power. All results involving negative reciprocity reviewed in the
criterion-related validity section are substantially unaffected when including the impression management score as
a covariate.
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negative reciprocity in its behavioural counterpart, rewarding or punishing behaviour. The
full list of scenarios is reported in Appendix B.
The first four criteria had the following common characteristics: first, a fictitious other
made an allocation of payoff between self and the participant. Then, the participant was
asked to allocate a given endowment. For each scenario, a table containing all values for
all combinations summarized the effects of the possible choices. The allocation choices of
the participants were transformed into a reciprocity score. Two criteria were relevant for
reward, with participants asked to allocate money to the fictitious other, whereas two
criteria were relevant for punishment, with the participant asked to invest a portion of their
endowment to reduce the gains of the fictitious other.
The fifth criterion was a decomposed form of the Ultimatum Game (Guth, Schmittberger,
& Schwarze, 1982; Thaler, 1988). The Ultimatum Game can be formally analysed in terms
of reciprocity (Gallucci & Perugini, 1997). For individuals high in reciprocity there are
different degrees of satisfaction for different combinations of proposal and acceptance
decisions and it is possible to order them as a function of their distances from the optimal
combination. An index of optimality of the combination between proposals and responses
from the perspective of a reciprocator can therefore be created and used as a criterion.14
Positive reciprocity was expected to be especially related to the two reciprocity scores
regarding reward allocations, whereas negative reciprocity was expected to predict the
punishment allocations. We also expected that positive reciprocity would have been linked
with the decomposed Ultimatum Game’s criterion. As far as the beliefs in reciprocity scale
is concerned, we expected it to show weaker links with the criteria than the other two
scales, as this dimension is likely to play a more distal role than the two behavioural
dimensions of reciprocity. The data were analysed by means of a canonical correlation
analysis.15 This analysis allows us to investigate the relationship between the two sets of
variables (criteria and predictors), by extracting the significant canonical roots that
maximize the common variability between them. The results are presented in Table 4,
including the basic correlations, and they generally support the predictions.
The first two canonical components were significant, with values of 0.36 and 0.26,
respectively. The first canonical component was defined by the two reward criteria and the
decomposed Ultimatum Game ( 0.50, 0.73, and 0.61, respectively) and by the scale of
positive reciprocity (0.99), whereas the second canonical component was defined by the
two punishment criteria (0.84 and 0.67, respectively) and by the two scales of negative
reciprocity and beliefs in reciprocity (0.81 and 0.88, respectively). In total, 51.6% of the
variance of the criteria and 81.0% of variance of the predictors was explained by the two
canonical components. Overall, the pattern of results indicates a clear difference between
positive and negative reciprocity. In general, whenever the game allows for punishments
and the history of allocations elicits negative reactions, individual differences in negative
reciprocity are affecting the likelihood of reciprocating the previous unfair allocation of
the other person, although this does not always achieve significance in the canonical
correlation analysis. On the contrary, when the emphasis is on the possibility to reward, as
in the reward allocations, individual differences in positive reciprocity come into play. The
negative correlation of positive reciprocity with the unfair–reward criterion and the lack of
14A formal prediction of the model of reciprocity when applied to the Ultimatum Game is that individuals high in
reciprocity will offer 50% of the endowment when proposers and accept 33% of the endowment when responders
(Gallucci & Perugini, 1997; Perugini & Gallucci, 1998). Any other combination would give decreasing utility
according to a reversed U-shaped curve and this is reflected in diminishing values of the criterion.
15We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
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significant relations of the latter with negative reciprocity are interesting, as they indicate
that not only the valence of the previous behaviour (fair versus unfair) but also the
preference for the type of reaction (reward versus punishment) are playing a role.
Study 2
The previous study has shown that sensitivity to the other’s previous behaviour (positive
versus negative) is not the only determinant of whether individual differences in positive or
negative reciprocity are relevant. In fact, higher scores in positive reciprocity were related to
stronger reactions to unfair (negative) behaviour, expressed as allocating lower rewards
(positive sanction). However, the relation between individual differences in reciprocity and
fairness seems peculiar: the pattern of correlations with the scales of altruism (see Table 3(b))
suggests that positive reciprocators are also concerned with being fair in terms of outcomes
whereas negative reciprocators are not. The second study was therefore designed to
investigate further these aspects. With this aim, we manipulated the other’s behavioural
valence (kind versus unkind), the way participants could react to this behaviour (reward
versus punishment), and the consequence of their reaction (fair versus unfair).
Method: participants and procedure
The participants were 95 university students at the University of Essex (United Kingdom),
with 38 females and 57 males (average age¼ 21.2, SD¼ 2.0). They were given a small
booklet containing the PNR scales and two scenarios. Participants were asked to imagine
as vividly as they could these hypothetical situations. The first scenario (negative event)
described the participant as asking a colleague for some help in understanding an
Table 4. Canonical correlation analysis of the PNR scales with decision-making criteria (N¼ 200)
(a) Correlations
Criterion Reciprocity scales
Other choices Reaction type Beliefs in Negative Positive
reciprocity reciprocity reciprocity
1. Unfair Reward 0.00 0.05 0.18*
2. Fair–cooperative Reward 0.05 0.00 0.25**
3. Unfair punishment 0.18* 0.20** 0.01
4. Unfair–individualist Punishment 0.17* 0.14* 0.11
5. Decomposed Ultimatum Game 0.09 0.06 0.21*
(b) Regression weights ( values)
Criterion Reciprocity scales
Other choices Reaction type Beliefs in Negative Positive
reciprocity reciprocity reciprocity
1. Unfair Reward 0.00 0.04 0.18*
2. Fair–cooperative Reward 0.11 0.07 0.27**
3. Unfair Punishment 0.11 0.15þ 0.00
4. Unfair–individualist Punishment 0.12 0.09 0.11
5. Decomposed Ultimatum Game 0.03 0.06 0.21*
þp¼ 0.06; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01.
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assignment. This person refused to help by claiming that he/she did not know anything
about it, whereas the participants knew that this was not true. The second scenario
(positive event) described the participant carrying many heavy bags from the supermarket
and walking home. A passer-by insisted on helping the participant and went out of his/her
way to carry some of the bags to the participant’s house. The events were presented in
counterbalanced order in the booklets.
Participants could react to these events as follows. The participant was asked to imagine
that he/she was participating in an experiment at the Department of Psychology and, to his/
her surprise, discovered that he/she was paired with the person mentioned in the previous
event (the help-denier or the help-giver). In this experiment the participant could divide at
his/her discretion a certain number of tokens between him/her and the other, who could only
accept the participant’s decision (i.e. a Dictator Game, DG). The dependent variable was the
number of tokens given to the other. For each scenario, participants were asked to react using
three different allocation rules, all presenting 11 possible divisions of tokens. The first
allocation task was a standard DG, with divisions ranging from give nothing (0 tokens) to the
other or to give all to other (500 tokens). The second allocation task was such that the first
division was unfair and advantageous for the participant (2500 versus 1000 tokens) and the
last division was fair (1500 versus 1500). The participant had to give increasing rewards to
the other at increasing expenses to him- or herself to approach a fair division. Finally, for the
third allocation rule, the first choice was unfair and advantageous for the other (500 versus
750 tokens) and the last division was fair (250 versus 250). In this case, the participant had to
give increasing punishments to the other at increasing personal costs to approach a fair
division. Therefore, both the second and the third allocation rule were approaching a fair
allocation (50% each), but either from a disadvantageous or an advantageous starting point,
and either by using rewards or punishments, always at a cost for self.
Hypotheses
We had three within-subject experimental designs, one for each allocation task, whereby
the manipulated variable was the valence of the previous other’s behaviour (positive versus
negative). The other two key variables (reaction type and reaction consequences) were
embedded in the type of allocation task as explained in the following.
The hypotheses for the first allocation rule (standard DG) were straightforward. It was
expected that positive reciprocators want to give more to the other after a positive event
whereas negative reciprocators want to give less to the other after a negative event.
Therefore, this allocation rule allows testing the differential sensitivity to positive and
negative behaviours by positive and negative reciprocators, respectively. This is the first of
the three differences assumed between positive and negative reciprocators (cf. p. 5).
The second and third allocation tasks allow for a more complex pattern of predictions
that are exploiting the second and third defining differences between positive and negative
reciprocators, that is their preference for positive versus negative sanctioning and their
different definition of what constitues a fair behaviour.
Second allocation task (fair–reward DG). If the previous event is positive, positive
reciprocators are expected to be especially sensitive to this sanctioning aspect that combines
both rewarding someone and being fair in terms of outcomes. If the event is negative, to
punish the other through lower rewards would also imply being less fair in terms of
outcomes, and this undesirable feature should prevent positive reciprocators from giving
lower rewards. Negative reciprocators have been shown not to be concerned with this
fairness aspect, and therefore they are expected to be especially sensitive to the possibility of
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using negative sanctions if the other deserved (i.e. s/he behaved in a negative way). Third
allocation task (fair–punishment DG). With positive events, a positive sanction should be
expressed by not punishing the other and, crucially, by not approaching a fairer split. We
know that positive reciprocators have also a desire to achieve equal splits. However, in this
specific case it would imply punishing the other, which is something undesirable for them. It
follows that they should experience a dilemma between behaving fairly and punishing the
other, with the two features calling for opposite choices and which would possibly result in a
lack of significant effects. In contrast, negative reciprocators should not experience this
dilemma because as we have hypothesized they are less concerned with approaching an
equal split. It follows that they might be more willing to reward a positive action through
lower punishments, being less important for them to achieve fairness in the sense of equal
outcomes. When the previous interpersonal event is negative, positive reciprocators should
have an additional reason to punish the other, given that higher punishments have the
important feature of increasing the fairness of the final distribution. Finally, negative
reciprocators should be still willing to punish the other, but possibly to a lower extent than
positive reciprocators given that they do not have the additional reason of increasing the
fairness of the distribution. The predicted pattern of results in the second and third allocation
tasks is therefore a consequence of the hypothesized difference between positive and
negative reciprocators in terms of preference for a type of reaction (reward versus
punishment) combined with the difference in terms of concern for consequence of their
reaction (fair versus unfair), and with different prescriptions depending on whether the other
has behaved positively or negatively.
Results and discussion
Results were obtained as follows: a factorial analysis of covariance16 was performed for
each dependent variable, with the within factor valence of the previous event (negative
versus positive) and the scores in the two scales of positive and negative reciprocity as
covariates.17 Considering first the standard 11-step DG, there was a strong main effect of
valence (F(1, 92)¼ 201.891, p< 0.001), meaning that the allocation to the other after a
positive event was much more generous than after a negative event (49.7% versus 11.1%)
and a main effect of positive reciprocity (F(1, 92)¼ 20.69, p< 0.001) and of negative
reciprocity (F(1, 92)¼ 10.04, p< 0.01). The main effects were qualified by significant
interactions (positive reciprocity valence, F(1, 92)¼ 4.51, p< 0.05; negative
reciprocity valence, F(1, 92)¼ 7.72, p< 0.01). Simple effects analyses showed that
positive reciprocators were more likely to allocate more after a positive event (¼ 0.45,
p< 0.001) but not to allocate less after a negative event (¼ 0.16, ns), whereas negative
reciprocators were more likely to allocate less after a negative event (¼  0.48,
p< 0.001) but not to allocate more after a positive event (¼  0.00, ns).
For the second allocation task (fair–reward DG), there were again main effects of valence
(F(1, 92)¼ 99.67, p< 0.001), positive reciprocity (F(1, 92)¼ 18.85, p< 0.001) and negative
reciprocity (F(1, 92)¼ 19.39, p< 0.01), qualified by significant interactions (positive
reciprocity valence, F(1, 92)¼ 5.44, p< 0.05; negative reciprocity valence, F(1, 92)¼
6.67, p< 0.01). Consistent with expectations, positive reciprocators were more likely to
16As kindly suggested by an anonymous referee, we have also analysed the data by a more complex 3 2
MANCOVA design. The results are basically unchanged, especially as far as the simple effects are concerned. For
the sake of simplicity, we report the results of three separate ANCOVAs.
17The results are virtually unchanged when introducing as a third covariate the scale of beliefs in reciprocity. See
the discussion for more on this issue.
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reward more after a positive event (¼ 0.48, p< 0.001) whereas negative reciprocators were
more likely to reward less after a negative event (¼  0.55, p< 0.001).
For the third allocation task (fair–punishment DG), the main effect of valence was
significant (F(1, 92)¼ 54.78, p< 0.001) but not for positive and negative reciprocity
(F(1, 92)¼ 2.45, ns, and F(1, 92)¼ 1.57, ns, respectively). However the main effect was
qualified by significant interactions with positive reciprocity (F(1, 92)¼ 6.68, p< 0.05)
and negative reciprocity (F(1, 92)¼ 6.60, p< 0.05). Positive reciprocators were more
likely to sanction more after a negative event (¼ 0.29, p¼ 0.01) whereas negative
reciprocators were more likely to punish less after a positive event (¼  0.27, p< 0.05).
Finally, note that negative reciprocators were also likely to punish more after a negative
event, although this difference did not reach the conventional level of statistical
significance (¼ 0.16, p¼ 0.11), confirming therefore our theoretical reasoning about the
additional influence of fairness for positive reciprocators.
The results of the significant interactions are recapped compactly in Figure 1, dividing
for purposes of simplicity the groups into high and low scorers for each of the two
dimensions of reciprocity.
The results clearly sustain the hypotheses. The pattern of results shows evidence of
validity for both dimensions. First, overall both positive and negative reciprocators are
reacting differentially to a friendly versus unfriendly partner. However, the results also
suggest evidence of differential validity between the two scales. Positive reciprocators are
more generous in the allocation following a positive behaviour (Figure 1(a)), are more
willing to reward a positive behaviour when this additionally increases the overall fairness
of the distribution (Figure 1(b)), and are more willing to punish a negative behaviour, but
only if this additionally imply achieving a fairer split (Figure 1(c)). On the other hand,
negative reciprocators are less generous when the other has behaved negatively
(Figure 1(e)) they are willing to reward less a negative behaviour when rewarding is the
only way to express a negative sanction (Figure 1(b)), and they are willing to punish less
after a positive behaviour and, to a minor extent, to punish more after a negative behaviour
when punishment is the only way to express sanctioning (Figure 1(c)).
These outcomes reveal a complex yet systematic relation between personality
dimensions, reciprocal behaviour, and important situational features. The specific
behavioural reaction in terms of reciprocity seems in fact to be heavily influenced by the
type of reciprocator (positive versus negative), which in turn implies differences in
sensitivity to previous events (positive versus negative), sanction opportunities (reward
versus punishment), and sanction consequences (fair versus unfair). These results obviously
call for further investigation that should confirm and extend the pattern found in this study.
Additional studies
The PNR scales have been used also in other studies and there is additional evidence of
criterion validity for the three scales. Perugini and Gallucci (working manuscript) have
found that individuals with high scores in negative reciprocity strongly decreased the
payoffs allocated to others who behaved negatively, regardless of whether they were
expecting future interactions with them, whereas individuals with high beliefs in
reciprocity significantly decreased the payoff to others who behaved negatively only when
there was no expectation of future interactions. The link between the negative reciprocity
dimension and the allocation of payoffs to others who behaved negatively was confirmed
in another study, where it was found that this link was unaffected by the type of expected
future interaction (i.e. with a friend or with a potential acquaintance) (Perugini & Gallucci,
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2001). Finally, Gallucci and Perugini (2002) have found in a three-stage experimental
game (the so-called Information Game), involving actual monetary decisions, that
participants with a combination of high scores in positive reciprocity and beliefs in
reciprocity are willing to forego possible economic gains in the first stage in order to
acquire information about what the other did in the previous interaction (i.e. information
which is essential to reciprocation). Moreover, participants with high scores in positive
reciprocity are more likely to reciprocate the observed behaviour, again at a monetary cost,
both when acquiring the past information (second stage) and when, being the opponent,
informed about the first player’s choice (third stage). The results were substantially
confirmed in a second experiment with a simplified version of the Information Game.
Figure 1. Study 2: graphical representation of the significant interactions for the three dependent variables.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the two studies demonstrate the good psychometric properties and validity of
the PNR. The PNR is structured in three dimensions: positive reciprocity, which
encompasses positive reactions to positively valued behaviours with the emphasis on
rewarding someone else’s behaviour; negative reciprocity, where the emphasis is on
punishing someone else’s behaviour and to match negative reactions to negatively valued
behaviour; and beliefs in reciprocity, concerning the view that both forms of reciprocity are
generally effective and widely used. The three scales showed good factorial structures and
reasonable reliabilities, were generalizable to gender and two countries and showed a pattern
of relations with other constructs supporting their validity. They were predictive of specific
outcomes in specific ways. It should be acknowledged that the two studies were scenario
based and therefore only partly informative about actual reciprocal behaviour. However,
other studies (e.g. Gallucci & Perugini, 2002) have confirmed the predictive validity of the
PNR scales for actual behaviours. Among others, two main points emerged from our results:
(i) reciprocity can also be defined as an internalized social norm, which is endorsed in
different degrees by different individuals, and (ii) three main dimensions of reciprocity as a
personality dimension can be reliably distinguished and lead to different predictions.
Internal norm versus strategy
A body of experimental results, including our own, suggests that reciprocity is not only a
strategy of behaviours useful to increase personal gains, but also a personal norm that can
be active in conditions where there are no obvious material advantages in so doing
(Gallucci & Perugini, 2000, 2002; Goren & Bornstein, 1999; Komorita & Parks, 1999; Rind
& Strohmetz, 1999; Van Lange, 1999). The PNR scales aim to measure individual
differences in the strength of this internalized norm, and therefore they are mostly targeted
at conditions that might defy usual explanations in terms of reciprocal benefits (e.g. tit-for-
tat, reciprocal altruism). This does not imply that reciprocal behaviours supported by
material advantages and strategic considerations are not important or widespread, but they
do not exhaust the field of all possible reciprocal behaviours. There also exist behaviours,
equally important and widespread, which are of a reciprocal nature but not mainly
opportunistic. These behaviours cannot be easily accounted for by other factors. In this
sense, the reciprocators as detected by the PNR scales are a subset of all who in general
might be likely to reciprocate. They are individuals who are inclined to reciprocate because
they feel satisfied when they do it. Anecdotal evidence based on explanations given by
reciprocators for their behaviour after being debriefed in some of our experiments points to
an overwhelming majority of individuals reporting that they reciprocated because they felt
it was the proper thing to do. Usual explanations were in terms of the deservingness of the
other with whom they interacted, and of their willingness to sanction (reward or punish) the
other’s behaviour. Future studies should look more systematically at the links between self-
reported explanations and individual differences in the propensity to reciprocate.
Three dimensions of reciprocity
The results of the studies have shown that it is feasible and useful to distinguish three
aspects of reciprocity as a personality dimension. The results of the second study have also
clarified some of the important differences between positive and negative reciprocators.
This is a very important issue that needs additional research to corroborate and extend the
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differences that we have sketched. It is also important to point out the role played by other
mechanisms that have not been explored in this contribution. Particularly important
appears the role played by emotions as potential mediator of the impact of positive and
negative reciprocity on reciprocal behaviour. There is increasing evidence that emotional
factors play an important role in situations of interdependence of outcomes (Fehr &
Gachter, 2002) and in decision making in general (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley,
& Cohen, 2001). It is very likely that reciprocal behaviour is associated with specific
emotional reactions, which appear also very important in differentiating between positive
and negative reciprocity. Whereas negative reciprocity should be associated with
emotional states of anger and distress (e.g. Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998), one
would expect positive reciprocity to be associated with states of happiness and satisfaction,
as well as with anticipation of guilt if one did not reciprocate a positive behaviour. These
differences may explain according to what mechanism negative reciprocators react
preferentially to negative actions and positive reciprocators to positive actions. Moreover,
it remains to be seen whether different emotional reactions fully mediate the impact of
positive versus negative reciprocity on reciprocal behaviour, or whether this mediation is
only partial. Future research should address these important issues.
We would like now to draw attention to the dimension of beliefs in reciprocity. This
dimension captures the more ideological and cognitive side of the reciprocity mechanism,
as shown by its pattern of correlations with relevant measures. It can also predict specific
reciprocal behaviour, but in general it is expected to be a more distal determinant, whose
influence is likely to be mediated or moderated by specific behavioural propensities to
reciprocate. The second study offers an example of mediation. When considered in
isolation as a covariate in the basic designs of the second study, the beliefs in reciprocity
dimension interacted significantly with the factor valence for all three allocation tasks
(F¼ 8.824, p< 0.01, F¼ 11.057, p< 0.001, F¼ 12.315, p< 0.001, for the first, second,
and third allocation task, respectively; all F values with 1, 93 df). Its influence completely
disappeared when considered alongside the two scales of positive and negative reciprocity
(F¼ 0.059, ns, F¼ 0.051, ns, F¼ 0.087, ns, for the first, second, and third allocation rules,
respectively; all F values with 1, 91 df ). In contrast, a study by Gallucci and Perugini
(2002) offers an example of moderation. Players in an experimental game, before making
their allocation choices (second stage), were more likely to request information
concerning the other player’s first stage allocation choice (strategically irrelevant but
essential for reciprocation) if they had higher scores in both beliefs in reciprocity and
positive reciprocity. Note that it was possible (50% chance) that the other player was going
to play a third allocation stage. Hence, expectations about whether the other player was
going to reciprocate in turn could have played a role, although by design there was no
strategic advantage in eliciting the other player’s reciprocity in the third allocation stage by
being generous in the second allocation stage. In general, the role of the beliefs in
reciprocity dimension should be more relevant whenever expectations and beliefs are
likely to play a primary role in a specific situation.
Conclusions
Reciprocity can be a subjectively internalized mechanism that can be reliably measured in
the individual differences it produces. This is the main message of the present
contribution. So far, theoretical elaborations have not focused specifically on reciprocity
as an internalized norm and no measure has been available to quantify individual
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differences in this propensity. The PNR scales might fill this gap. There are several
behaviours with a reciprocal flavour that cannot be easily understood and predicted within
a frame emphasizing repeated interactions or general unconditional personality
dispositions. Reciprocity can be understood also as a conditional contextualized
personality construct that can explain, in conjunction with a careful analysis of the
situational contingencies, otherwise seemingly irrational or costly behaviours. The studies
reported here, as well as other recent studies, provide robust evidence of the validity of the
PNR scales. The PNR scales seem particularly promising whenever the emphasis is on
reciprocity as an internalized motivation. Whereas the studies reported in this contribution
have mostly focused on behaviours with economic consequences, we would expect that
the scales might be usefully applied also to behaviours having materially or
psychologically costly consequences without being necessarily of an economic nature.
Another very interesting area concerns cross-cultural studies. Being mostly a precipitate
of prevailing socialization practices and socio-cultural differences, it is likely that in
different countries different aspects of the personal norm of reciprocity are differently
endorsed by individuals. The differences between Italy and the United Kingdom in
average values and correlations with some other constructs concerning negative and
positive reciprocity are a good example of how cross-cultural research might be revealing.
Future studies might unravel the complex interactions among the basic norm of reciprocity
and the cultural forces that shape it into individual values.
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APPENDIX A: PNR QUESTIONNAIRE
Beliefs in reciprocity
Br1 To help somebody is the best policy to be certain that s/he will help you in the future
Br2 I do not behave badly with others so as to avoid them behaving badly with me
Br3 I fear the reactions of a person I have previously treated badly
Br4 If I work hard, I expect it will be repaid
Br5 When I pay someone compliments, I expect that s/he in turn will reciprocate
Br6 I avoid being impolite because I do not want others being impolite with me
Br7 If I help tourists, I expect that they will thank me nicely
B8 It is obvious that if I treat someone badly s/he will look for revenge
Br9 If I don’t leave a good tip in a restaurant, I expect that in future I will not get good
service
Positive reciprocity
Pr1 I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before
Pr2 If someone does a favour for me, I am ready to return it
Pr3 If someone is helpful with me at work, I am pleased to help him/her
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Pr4 I’m ready to do a boring job to return someone’s previous help
Pr5 When someone does me a favour, I feel committed to repay him/her
Pr6 If someone asks me politely for information, I’m really happy to help him/her
Pr7 If someone lends me money as a favour, I feel I should give him/her back something
more than what is strictly due
Pr8 If somebody suggests to me the name of the winning horse at the race, I would
certainly give him/her part of my winnings*
Pr9 I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before
Negative reciprocity
Nr1 If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take my revenge as soon as possible, no matter what
the costs
Nr2 I am willing to invest time and effort to reciprocate an unfair action
Nr3 I am kind and nice if others behave well with me, otherwise it’s tit-for-tat
Nr4 If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her
Nr5 If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back
Nr6 If someone is unfair to me, I prefer to give him/her what s/he deserves instead of
accepting his/her apologies
Nr7 I would not do a favour for somebody who behaved badly with me, even if it meant
foregoing some personal gains
Nr8 If somebody is impolite to me, I become impolite
Nr9 The way I treat others depends much on how they treat me
*The Italian item is ‘If somebody suggests to me the winning numbers at the Lottery, I would
certainly give him/her part of my winnings’.
APPENDIX B: DECISION MAKING SCENARIOS OF STUDY 1 (N¼ 200)
All scenarios were preceded by a general instruction as follows.
‘In this final part of the booklet you will be asked to read a series of description of some
situations and to indicate how you would choose if you had been in the situation as
described. Please try to become involved in each situation and to make your involvement
in the scene as realistic as possible. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, but
only answers that reflect what you would actually do in such circumstances. Please
concentrate on yourself in the experience depicted and on how you would behave.’
1. Unfair–reward
 The other has divided £100 000 as follows: £70 000 for self and £30 000 for you. Now
it’s up to you. You have £100 000 and can decide how to allocate the money between
you and the other among the options presented below.
(please tick one)
For you £0 £10 000 £20 000 £30 000 £40 000 £50 000 £60 000 £70 000 £80 000 £90 000 £100 000
For the other £100 000 £90 000 £80 000 £70 000 £60 000 £50 000 £40 000 £30 000 £20 000 £10 000 £0
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2. Fair/cooperative–reward
(between brackets are the values used in the second scenario)
 The other had the possibility to choose one of the following three options, and they
chose the one ticked.
Therefore, the other has gained £70 000 [£60 000] and you £60 000 [£50 000]. Now you
have £50 000 at your disposal. You can decide to allocate this amount in any way you wish
between you and othe other.
3. Unfair–punishment
 The other has divided £100 000 as follows: £80 000 for self and £20 000 for you. Now
it’s up to you. You can decide how much, if any, you want to spend of £50 000 at your
disposal to reduce the other’s overall gain. Your final gain will be given by £20 000 plus
what is left of £50 000 after your decision. The other final gain will be given by £80 000
minus the amount that you will decide to reduce.
Other’s choice ) X [X]
Gains +
£70 000 £60 000 £40 000
For the other [£70 000] [£60 000] [£40 000]
£60 000 £40 000 £30 000
For you [£30 000] [£50 000] [£20 000]
(Tick your choice)
Choice)
Your
part £50 000 £45 000 £40 000 £35 000 £30 000 £25 000 £20 000 £15 000 £10 000 £5000 £0
Other’s
part £0 £5000 £10 000 £15 000 £20 000 £25 000 £30 000 £35 000 £40 000 £45 000 £50 000
(please tick one)
Choice)
Your costs £0 £5000 £10 000 £15 000 £20 000 £25 000 £30 000 £35 000 £40 000 £45 000 £50 000
Other’s
total gains £80 000 £72 000 £64 000 £56 000 £48 000 £40 000 £32 000 £24 000 £16 000 £8000 £0
Your total
gains £70 000 £65 000 £60 000 £55 000 £50 000 £45 000 £40 000 £35 000 £30 000 £25 000 £20 000
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4. Unfair/individualist–punishment
(between brackets are the values used in the second scenario)
 The other had the possibility to choose one of the following three options, and they
chose the one ticked.
Therefore, the other has gained £70 000 [£70 000] and you £30 000 [£40 000]. Now you
have £50 000 at your disposal. You can decide how much, if any, you want to spend of
£50 000 to reduce the other’s overall gain. Your final gain will be given by £30 000 [£40 000]
plus £50 000 minus what you have decided to spend to reduce the other’s gains. The other’s
overall gains will be £70 000 [£70 000] minus the amount that you will decide to reduce.
5. Decomposed ultimatum game [abbreviated scenarios]
First part: received offers
Now there are some situations whereby some offers are made first by another person to you
and then by you to the other person. Your task in this first part will be to decide, for each
proposed division, whether to accept it or refuse it, in which case neither you nor the other
will receive any money.
 The other has £100 000 lire, offers you £40 000 lire and keeps for self £60 000;
please tick your choice
(A) accept, I will have £40 000 and the other person will have £60 000
(B) refuse, I will have £0 and the other person will have £0.
[Four other proposals follow in random order: 10/90; 20/80; 30/70; 50/50].
Second part: proposal of divisions
In this second part you are asked to propose a division and the other now can either accept
or refuse, in which latter case neither of you will receive any money. Tick your chosen
proposal
(Please tick one)
Choice )
Your costs £0 £5000 £10 000 £15 000 £20 000 £25 000 £30 000 £35 000 £40 000 £45 000 £50 000
Other’s £70 000 £63 000 £56 000 £49 000 £42 000 £35 000 £28 000 £21 000 £14 000 £7000 £0
total gains
Your total £80 000 £75 000 £70 000 £65 000 £60 000 £55 000 £50 000 £45 000 £40 000 £35 000 £30 000
gains
Other’s choice ) X [X]
Gains +
£70 000 £60 000 £40 000
For the other [£60 000] [£70 000] [£60 000]
£30 000 £50 000 £20 000
For you [£50 000] [£40 000] [£60 000]
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